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INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiff/ Appellant Steven Eric Graham ("Mr. Graham") was 
granted permission to file this Appeal by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by Order dated 
December 26, 2018. 
This Appeal is taken from an interlocutory Order of the District Court, 
which denied Mr. Graham's motion for partial summary judgment, and 
granted Defendant/Appellee's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, 
on the issue of whether Mr. Graham's First Cause of Action, for Wrongful 
Termination in Violation of Public Policy, is pre-empted by the 
administrative remedy established by Utah Code §34A-6-203 of the Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("UOSH Act"). 
The District Court's ruling upon the parties' cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment recognizes that the UOSH Act "does not contain an 
express exclusive remedy provision . . .. " However, the District Court held 
that "a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose of the 
UOSH Act." Mr. Graham submits that the District Court's decision on this 
issue is incorrect based upon the following grounds: (1) the District Court 
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did not apply the appropriate legal standards in deciding this issue; (2) the 
District Court did not properly consider Mr. Graham's evidence against pre-
emption; and; (3) the limited remedies under Utah Code §34A-6-203(2)(c) 
establish an inference against pre-emption. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented for review in this Appeal is whether the 
administrative remedy provided by Utah Code §34A-6-203 of the Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act pre-empts Mr. Graham's claim for 
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. The District Court 
decided that such claim is pre-empted based upon the parties' cross-motions 
for partial summary judgment. The District Court's ruling upon summary 
judgment is reviewed on appeal for correctness, without deference to the 
District Court's legal conclusions. Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 
95; 61 P.3d 989, 991 (Utah 2002). The Order of the District Court upon the 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, which is attached hereto as 
Addendllill "A", indicates that this issue was preserved in the District Court. 
[R. 565-569]. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of the Facts.1 
1. Plaintiff/ Appellant Steven Eric Graham ("Mr. Graham") 
commenced employment with Defendant Albertson's LLC ("Albertson's") 
on June 6, 2016, as an Order Puller at Albertson's Salt Lake City 
Distribution Center. [R. 55]. 
2. On December 6, 2016, Mr. Graham injured his back while lifting 
cases of product at work. [R. 55]. 
3. On January 30, 2017, Mr. Graham complained to Albertson' s 
Human Resources Manager that he was b.eing harassed by his supervisors 
and coworkers in retaliation for reporting his workplace injury. [R. 4]. 
4. Mr. Graham was discharged from his employment with 
Albertson's on February 10, 2017. [R. 66]. 
1 Appellant's Statement of the Facts is based upon Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum, which was filed 
in the District Court on April 17, 2018. [R.53-62.] The factual allegations of 
said Motion are supported by the Declaration of Steven Eric Graham, dated 
April 17, 2018 [R. 7 5-77]. As the party against whom summary judgment 
was granted, Mr. Graham is entitled to have all disputed issues of fact 
construed in his favor for purposes of this Appeal. Retherford v. AT & T 
Communications, 844 P.2d 954 (Utah 1992). 
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5. Mr. Graham alleges I this action that he was discharged in 
retaliation for reporting his injury, and for complaining about harassment 
and retaliation that he received from his supervisors and co-workers as a 
result of his injury [R. 65-67]. 
6. The limitations period for filing an administrative claim under 
Utah Code §34A-6-203 is 30 days. 
7. The administrative remedy provided by Utah Code §34A-6-203 is 
limited to: "reinstatement of the employee to the employee's former position 
with back pay." 
B. Procedural History of the Case. 
8. Mr. Graham filed his Complaint in this action in the District Court 
on January 29, 2018. Said Complaint alleges three Causes of Action, as 
follows: (1) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (2) Breach 
of Contract; (3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing. [R. 1-14]. 
9 . Mr. Graham's First Cause of Action alleges that he was 
discharged in retaliation for reporting a work place injury in violation of the 
public policy of the State of Utah. The specific public policy asserted by Mr. 
Graham in his First Cause of Action is indicated by Utah Code §34A-6-203. 
[R. 7-8]. 
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10. Subsequent to the filing ofMr. Graham's Complaint, the parties 
filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether 
Mr. Graham's wrongful termination claim is pre-empted by the 
administrative remedy established by Utah Code §34A-6-203. [R. 53-
72;132-136].2 
11. In support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Mr. 
Graham asserted that certain provisions of the Utah Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, specifically, Utah Code §34A-6-201, §34A-6-301(3)(b)(iii), and 
§34A-6-301(3)(b)(vi)-(vii), create a right and obligation on the part of 
employees to report workplace injuries which result in, inter alia, medical 
treatment and restriction of work, and that Utah Code §34A-6-203 indicates 
a public policy within the State of Utah which prohibits employers from 
retaliating against employees for exercising such rights. [R. 55-58]. 
Albertson's did not dispute these assertions. 
12. On July 30, 2018, Mr. Graham filed Plaintiffs Notice of 
Supplemental Authority. [R. 215-216]. Said Notice of Supplemental 
Authority advised the District Court of certain provisions of R6 l 4- l - l O.L.3-
2 The parties filed opposition and reply memoranda in the District Court as 
provided by Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [R.114-131; 139-
151 ;154-200]. The District Court held oral argument upon said motions on 
September 7, 2018. [R.536-537]. 
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5 of the Utah Administrative Code, which provide for the deferral of the 
administrative remedy under Utah Code §34A-6-203, "Where a complainant 
is in fact pursuing remedies other than those provided by Section 34A-6-
203." 
13. On September 21, 2018, Mr. Graham filed a Second Notice of 
Supplemental Authority. [R. 541-542]. Said Second Notice of Supplemental 
Authority advised the District Court of certain provisions of Utah Code 
§34A-6-110, which provide that the remedies established by the Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act are not "deemed to limit or repeal 
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law." 
C. Disposition in the District Court. 
14. On October 12, 2018, the District Court entered its Order 
Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Denying Plaintiffs 
Motion for Leave to Perform Discovery. ("District Court's Order"3). [R. 
565-569]. The District Court's Order states in part: 
3. The Court finds that the UOSH Act preempts plaintiffs claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. This finding is based 
on the Court's analysis of the UOSH Act itself. Although the UOSH 
Act does not contain an express exclusive remedy provision, when 
3 A true and correct copy of the District Court's Order is attached hereto as 
Addendum "A". 
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examining the legislative intent behind the UOSH Act, the court finds 
that in passing the UOSH Act, the legislature put in place a 
comprehensive piece of legislation to provide for the safety and health 
of workers and provided a coordinated plan to establish standards to 
do so. The Court finds that a preemptive intent is implied by the 
structure and purpose of the UOSH Act. The UOSH Act establishes 
standards, procedures, a scheme of regulation, and a bureaucratic 
system to implement its aims in a timely and cost-effective approach. 
4. The Court notes plaintiff's argument that Utah Administrative 
Code rule R614- l -1 0.L indicates that the Legislature did not intend to 
preempt his tort claim, in that that administrative code provision 
provides for a postponement of the Administrator's determination in 
circumstances where other proceedings are ongoing and for deferral to 
the results of such proceedings. The Court's reading of that provision 
is that it applies to arbitration and other agency proceedings, and it 
does not change the Court's reading of the UOSH Act as it relates to a 
common-law tort claim, such as the one at issue here. 
5. The Court further finds that allowing plaintiffs common-law tort 
claim runs counter to the purpose of the UOSH Act in that it could 
discourage employees from making a claim under the UOSH Act in 
order to pursue broader remedies than those provided under the 
UOSH Act, and that claims under the UOSH Act address the concerns 
not only of individual employees but also the broader purpose of 
providing for the safety and welfare of all workers through the 
broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act. [R. 566-67]. 
The District Court did not address Mr. Graham's argument that Utah 
Code §34A-6-110 establishes that the remedies under the Utah Occupational 
Safety and Health Act are not "deemed to limit or repeal requirements 
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law." [R. 565-69]. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in this case by denying Plaintiffs motion for 
partial summary judgment, and granting the Defendant's motion for partial 
summary judgment, on the issue of whether Mr. Graham's wrongful 
termination is pre-empted by the administrative remedy established by Utah 
Code §34A-6-203. The District Court failed to apply the appropriate legal 
standards in deciding this issue, first, by failing to allocate the burden of 
proof to the Defendant, and second, by failing to require a "clear and 
manifest" intent to pre-empt on the part of the Utah Legislature, as required 
by applicable law. 
The District Court further erred by relying upon unsupported factual 
assumptions in support of its decision on pre-emption. The District Court 
assumed, without evidence, that recognition on Mr. Graham's wrongful 
termination claim would deter other workers from pursuing administrative 
claims under §34A-6-203, and impair the "broader purpose" of the UOSH 
Act in providing for the safety and welfare of all workers. Mr. Graham 
submits, to the contrary, that recognition of his wrongful termination claim 
would further the purpose of protecting the safety of Utah workers, and 
would not interfere with the administrative procedures under the UOSH Act. 
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Finally, the District Court failed to properly consider evidence that 
was presented by Mr. Graham indicating that the UOSH Act was not 
intended to pre-empt alternative remedies, including Mr. Graham's wrongful 
termination claim. Utah Code §34A-6-110 expressly states that the UOSH 
Act does not limit or repeal requirements imposed by statute or otherwise 
recognized by law, or supersede any common law or statutory rights with 
respect to injuries arising out of the course of employment. The District 
Court did not consider this Statute. Further, R614-1-10.L.3-5 of the Utah 
Administrative Code sets forth detailed provisions for the deferral of 
administrative proceedings under §34A-6-l 10 where "other proceedings" 
asserting "substantially the same as rights" are asserted in "other forums." 
The District Court incorrectly construed such deferral as being limited to 
alternative administrative proceedings and arbitration proceedings under 
labor contracts, and failed to consider the significance of these provisions on 
the broader issue of pre-emption. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
IS BARRED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY 
UNDER THE UTAH OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ACT. 
In Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95; 61 P.3d 989, 991 (Utah 
2002), the Utah Supreme Court held that a common law claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy was pre-empted by the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ("UADA"). Although 
the UADA contains an express exclusive remedy provision, the Gottling 
court considered possible circumstances in which pre-emption might occur 
in the absence of such a provision, stating: 
Sometimes courts, when facing the pre-emption question, find 
language in the ... statute that reveals an explicit [legislative] intent to 
pre-empt [common] law. More often, explicit pre-emption language 
does not appear, or does not directly answer the question. In that 
event, courts must consider whether the ... statute's "structure and 
purpose," or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a 
clear, but implicit, preemptive intent. [a] A ... statute, for example, 
may create a scheme of [statutory] regulation "so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that [the legislature] left no room for the 
[ common law] to supplement it." (b] Alternatively, [statutory] law 
may be in "irreconcilable conflict" with [the common] law. 
Compliance with both ... , for example, may be a "physical 
impossibility," or, [c] the [common] law may "stand as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives 
of [the legislature]." Gottling, 61 P.3d at 992. (quoting Barnett Bank 
of Marion Countyv. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31,116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 
L.Ed.2d 237 (1996). 
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The present Appeal directly raises the issue that was discussed within 
the above-quoted language from Gottling. It is undisputed that the DOSH 
Act contains no express exclusive remedy or pre-emption provision. 
Nevertheless, the District Court held that the administrative remedy 
established by the UOSH Act pre-empts Mr. Graham's wrongful termination 
claim because a legislative intent to pre-empt such claim "is implied by the 
structure and purpose of the UOSH Act." Specifically, the District Court 
held that the "DOSH Act establishes standards, procedures, a scheme of 
regulation, and a bureaucratic system to implement its aims in a timely and 
cost-effective approach." However, while purporting to follow Gottling, the 
District Court in this case did not properly allocate the burden of proof on 
the issue of pre-emption, and did not fully consider evidence presented by 
Mr. Graham establishing that the administrative remedy under the UOSH 
Act is not intended to be exclusive. 
A. The District Court Did Not Apply the Appropriate Legal 
Standards in this Case. 
The Defendant bears the burden of proof with respect to a defense of 
statutory pre-emption. Robertson v. Gem Insurance, 828 P.2d 496, 500 
(Utah App. 1992); State v. Jones, 958 P.2d 938, 940-41 (Utah App. 1998). 
In the present case, the District Court's Order provides no express 
reference to the burden of proof relating to the Defendant' s pre-emption 
11 
defense.4 However, proper application of the burden of proof is crucial in 
determining this issue, and would result in a ruling in favor of Mr. Graham. 
The Gottling court did not expressly discuss the proper burden of 
proof for determining a statutory pre-emption defense. However, the 
Gottling court stated that pre-emption only occurs where a statute's structure 
and purpose "reveal a clear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent." 61 P.3d at 992. 
This language from Gottling places a burden upon the party asserting pre-
emption to establish a clear legislative intent to pre-empt the claim in 
question. 
Gottling expressly relied upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
adopting the above-quoted principles relating to pre-emption. In fact, the 
Utah courts have generally relied upon Federal precedents in deciding pre-
emption issues. For example, in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23; 997 P.2d 
305 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme Court stated that decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court relating to federal pre-emption of state statutes are 
4 Mr. Graham's attorney argued that Albertson's bears the burden of proof 
upon its pre-emption defense at the hearing held in the District Court upon 
the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment on September 7, 
2018. 
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"analytically useful" in determining whether a Utah statute pre-empts a 
plaintiffs common law claims. 997 P.2d at 308.5 
In State v. Jones, 958 P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1998), the defendant 
moved to dismiss criminal charges brought against him for communications 
fraud under Utah law, on the grounds that the state law offense was pre-
empted by the Federal Employees Retirement System (PERS"). In 
upholding the district court's denial of said motion, the Utah Court of 
Appeals relied upon Utah and Federal precedents regarding the scope of 
statutory pre-emption, as follows: 
We do not "lightly infer preemption." International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,491, 107 S.Ct. 805, 811, 93 L.Ed.2d 883 
(1987); accord State v. Sterkel, 933 P.2d 409,412 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218,230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)(stating Court 
assumed "historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded" by federal legislation). In fact, it is inappropriate for us to 
conclude that federal legislation has preempted state law "unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice, 331 U.S. at 
230, 67 S.Ct. at 1152. This "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt 
state law can be shown either by express statutory language or by 
implication from the statutory structure and purpose. See FMC Corp. 
v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 403,407, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 
(1990). We infer preemption only when "[t]he scheme of federal 
regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," or when an 
" [ a ]ct of Congress ... touch[ es] a field in which the federal interest is 
5 See also Price Development Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26; 995 P.2d 
1237,1243 (Utah 2000); In re Estate of Hannifin, 2013 UT 46; 311 P.3d 
1016, 1018 (Utah 2013). 
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so dominant that the federal system [is] assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 
67 S.Ct. at 1152. 
Under State v. Jones, and the authorities cited therein, pre-emption 
occurs only where there is a "clear and manifest" intention to pre-empt 
expressed by the statutory language or by implication from the statutory 
structure and purpose. 
Further, a legislative intent to pre-empt may not be inferred merely 
from the comprehensiveness of a statute. In Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah 
Dep't of Transportation, 2007 UT 75; 171 P.3d 418 (Utah 2007), the 
defendant (UDOT) asserted that the plaintiff's inverse condemnation claims 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1983 were pre-empted by the defendant's previously-filed 
claims under Utah's direct condemnation statute. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims on pre-emption 
grounds, stating: 
[I]t is clear that to extinguish a § 1983 claim that is based on an 
underlying constitutional right, a defendant must establish that by 
passing a comprehensive statutory scheme "Congress has expressly 
withdrawn" the underlying constitutional remedy. "The statutory 
framework must be such that 'allowing a plaintiff' to bring a§ 1983 
action 'would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored 
scheme." Moreover, the presence of a comprehensive statutory 
scheme, by itself, "is not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate that 
Congress intended to foreclose a §1983 remedy." This difficult burden 
signals to us that the preemption of claims based on underlying 
constitutional rights is disfavored. In fact, the Court itself emphasized 
that it does not "lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude 
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reliance on§ 1983 as a remedy for a federally secured right." 171 P.3d 
at 422 (citations omitted).6 
The District Court failed to follow and apply the above-stated legal 
standards in the present case. First, the District Court failed to allocate the 
burden of proof to the defendant. Second, although the District Court found 
that "a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose of the 
UOSH Act," it did not find a "clear and manifest purpose" on the part of the 
Legislature to pre-empt Mr. Graham's claim. The District Court did not find 
that the UOSH Act is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
[ the legislature] left no room for the [ common law] to supplement it," or that 
Mr. Graham's claim is in "irreconcilable conflict" with the UOSH Act, as 
required by Gottling, 61 P.3d at 991. 
The one specific basis for pre-emption identified by the District Court 
appears in Paragraph 5 of the District Court's Order, which states: 
5. The Court further finds that allowing plaintiffs common-law tort 
claim runs counter to the purpose of the UOSH Act in that it could 
discourage employees from making a claim under the UOSH Act in 
order to pursue broader remedies than those provided under the 
UOSH Act, and that claims under the UOSH Act address the concerns 
not only of individual employees but also the broader purpose of 
6 See also, Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 
471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985)("we seldom infer, solely from the 
comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to preempt in its entirety 
a field related to health and safety"). 
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providing for the safety and welfare of all workers through the 
broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act. [R. 566-67]. 
There are several flaws in the District Court's reasoning. First, it is 
based upon an unsupported factual assumption that workers will forego an 
administrative claim under the UOSH Act to pursue their common law 
remedy. Although common law claims may provide for recovery beyond the 
extremely limited remedy that is available under the UOSH Act, they also 
require far greater time and resources to pursue. There is no reason to 
assume that workers who will benefit from the limited remedies under the 
UOSH Act will be less likely to pursue their administrative remedy. 
Perhaps more importantly, there is no basis to conclude that the 
availability of common law claims would undermine the purposes of the 
UOSH Act, rather than supporting and furthering those purposes. As noted 
by the District Court, the purpose of the UOSH Act is to provide "for the 
safety and welfare of all workers .... " The recognition of Mr. Graham's 
common law claim would further that same purpose. See Touchard v. La-Z-
Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71; 148 P.3d 945,952 (Utah 2006). 
Unlike the circumstances at issue in Gottling, where the Utah 
Legislature balanced the interests of remedying employment discrimination 
with the burden that such remedy would place upon "small employers," the 
present case involves no conflicting interest to the public policy asserted by 
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Graham. Utah employers do not have any legitimate interest in preventing 
their workers from reporting workplace injuries, or in retaliating against 
workers who do report their injuries. Nor has Albertson's identified any 
conflicting interest on the part of the State of any of its Agencies. To the 
contrary, the administrative procedures established under the UOSH Act are 
harmonious with the claim asserted by Mr. Graham. The mere fact that 
workers may have a choice between alternative remedies does not conflict 
with the administrative procedures, particularly when the relevant Agency 
has established rules for deferring to claims in other forums. 
The District Court failed to apply the appropriate legal standards in 
this case and based its finding of pre-emption upon unsupported factual 
assumptions, requiring reversal of the District Court's ruling upon summary 
judgment. 
B. The District Court Did Not Properly Consider Mr. Graham's 
Evidence Against Pre-emption. 
In the District Court, Mr. Graham argued that a legislative intent 
against pre-emption of his common law claim is reflected within the 
provisions of the UOSH Act. Specifically, Utah Code §34A-6-110 states in 
relevant part: 
Requirements of other laws not limited or repealed - Worker's 
Compensation or rights under other laws with respect to employme~t 
injuries not affected. 
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(1) Nothing in this chapter is deemed to limit or repeal requirements 
imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to supersede or 
in any manner affect workers' compensation or enlarge or diminish or 
affect the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of 
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, 
occupational or other diseases, or death of employees arising out of, 
or in the course of employment. ( emphasis added). 
These provisions indicate that the rights created under the UOSH Act 
are not intended to be exclusive, and expressly preserve common law claims 
with respect to workplace injuries. The statutory language certainly must 
extend to the reporting of such injuries. Although Mr. Graham argued §34A-
6-l 10 in the District Court, the District Court's Order contains no reference 
to the Statute. 
Mr. Graham also argued in the District Court that a legislative intent 
against pre-emption is reflected within R614-l-10.L.3-5 of the Utah 
Administrative Code which states: 
L. Arbitration or other agency proceedings. 
1. An employee who files a complaint under Section 34A-6-203(2) of 
the Act may also pursue remedies under grievance arbitration 
proceedings in collective bargaining agreements. In addition, the 
complainant may concurrently resort to other agencies for relief, such 
as the National Labor Relations Board. The Administrator's 
jurisdiction to entertain Section 34A-6-203 complaints, to investigate, 
and to determine whether discrimination has occurred, is independent 
of the jurisdiction of other agencies or bodies. The Administrator may 
18 
file action in district court regardless of the pendency of other 
proceedings. 
2 . However, the Administrator also recognizes the policy favoring 
voluntary resolution of disputes under procedures in collective 
bargaining agreements. By the same token, due deference should be 
paid to the jurisdiction of other forums established to resolve disputes 
which may also be related to Section 34A-6-203 complaints. 
3. Where a complainant is in fact pursuing remedies other than those 
provided by Section 34A-6-203, postponement of the Administrator's 
determination and deferral to the results of such proceedings may be 
in order. 
4. Postponement of determination. Postponement of determination 
would be justified where the rights asserted in other proceedings are 
substantially the same as rights under Section 34A-6-203 and those 
proceedings are not likely to violate the rights guaranteed by Section 
34A-6-203. The factual issues in such proceedings must be 
substantially the same as those raised by Section 34A-6-203 
complaint, and the forum hearing the matter must have the power to 
determine the ultimate issue of discrimination. 
5. Deferral to outcome of other proceedings. A determination to defer 
to the outcome of other proceedings initiated by a complainant must 
necessarily be made on a case-to-case basis, after careful scrutiny of 
all available information. Before deferring to the results of other 
proceedings, it must be clear that those proceedings dealt adequately 
with all factual issues, that the proceedings were fair, regular, and free 
of procedural infirmities, and that the outcome of the proceedings was 
not repugnant to the purpose and policy of the Act. In this regard, if 
such other actions initiated by a complainant are dismissed without 
adjudicative hearing thereof, such dismissal will not ordinarily be 
regarded as determinative of the Section 34A-6-203 complaint. 
( citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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The District Court held that this provision relates only to "arbitration 
and other agency proceedings," and not to Mr. Graham's common-law 
claim. [R. 566-67]. However, the District Court's interpretation is contrary 
to the language ofR614-1-10.L.3-5. Paragraph 1 (quoted above) states: 
"The Administrator's jurisdiction to entertain Section 34A-6-203 complaints, 
to investigate, and to determine whether discrimination has occurred, is 
independent of the jurisdiction of other agencies or bodies." ( emphasis 
added). The phrase "or bodies" clearly signifies that R614-1-1 0.L.3-5 is not 
limited to other agencies, nor is that phrase consistent merely with deferral 
to arbitration proceedings under labor agreements. Similarly, Paragraph 2 
refers to "other forums" and Paragraph 3 refers to "remedies other than those 
provided by Section 34A-6-203" without limitation. Paragraph 4 provides 
for agency deferral where "other proceedings are substantially the same as 
rights under Section 34A-6-203." Deferral under R614-l-10.L.3-5 is 
determined not by the nature of the forum, but by whether the rights 
involved in the alternative forum are similar to those provided by §34A-6-
203.7 
7 Further, R614-l-10.L.3-5 provides no rational basis for distinguishing 
proceedings in other agencies and labor arbitration proceedings from other 
types of remedies. In particular, there is no basis for distinguishing between 
arbitration proceedings under labor agreements and similar remedies that 
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Even if the District Court's reading ofR614- l - 10.L.3-5 was correct, it 
would miss the point. The fact that administrative claims under §34A-6-203 
are subject to deferral for some types of claims indicates that it is not 
considered to be an exclusive remedy or to pre-empt alternative claims. The 
relevant question under Gottling is whether a scheme of statutory regulation 
is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that [the legislature] left 
no room for the [common law] to supplement it." Gottling, 61 P.3d at 992. 
Clearly, that is not the case with respect to §34A-6-203. 
The District Court's holding on pre-emption conflicts with the 
practical realities of employment. The reporting of workplace injuries is 
required in numerous legal contexts, including health insurance, medical 
leave, disability and workers' compensation benefits. Utah Code §34A-6-
l l O recognizes this reality by expressly stating that the UOSH Act does not 
limit or repeal legal requirements imposed by statute or otherwise 
recognized at law, expressly including common law remedies. The District 
Court's decision on this issue is incorrect. 
might be provided by non-union employers. In fact, Mr. Graham has alleged 
such a claim in this case, based upon Albertson's alleged breach of its 
employment agreement, and Albertson's has not asserted that such claim is 
preempted by §34A-6-203. 
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C. The Limited Remedies Under §34A-6-203(2)(c) Establish an 
Inference Against Pre-emption. 
Utah Code §34A-6-203(2)(a) states: 
An employee who believes that the employee has been discharged or 
otherwise retaliated against by any person in violation of this section 
may, within 30 days after the violation occurs, file a complaint with 
the division alleging discharge or retaliation in violation of this 
section. ( emphasis added). 
Utah Code §34A-6-203(2)(c) states: 
Upon completion of the investigation, the division shall issue an 
order: 
(i) 
(A) finding a violation of this section has occurred; 
(B) requiring that the violation cease; and 
(C) which may include other appropriate relief, such as 
reinstatement of the employee to the employee's former position 
with back pay; or 
(ii) finding that a violation of the section has not occurred. ( emphasis 
added). 
The remedies available under Utah Code §34A-6-203(2)( c ), for an 
employee who has been discharged are limited to reinstatement, potentially 
with back pay.8 Even an award ofbackpay under the Statute appears to be 
8 In his administrative proceeding in the Utah Labor Commission, Mr. 
Graham filed a motion for partial summary judgment in relation to the scope 
of his potential remedies. [R 689-690]. On August 8, 2018, the ALJ issued 
an order stating that she lacked jurisdiction to award damages for 
reputational injuries, expenses for obtaining alternative employment, mental 
stress or punitive damages. [R 784-791]. 
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conditioned upon reinstatement. However, reinstatement is generally not 
available when hostilities exist between the parties or when the employment 
relationship has been irreparably damaged by the dispute over the discharge 
or by lack of confidence and loyalty. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah 1995). Therefore, §34A-6-203(2)(c) often provides 
no remedy whatsoever for an employee who has been discharged in 
retaliation for reporting a workplace injury. 
By contrast, tort claims for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy are intended to provide a full range of recovery for the vindication of 
clear and substantial public rights.9The Utah Supreme Court recognized such 
intent in Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1992), stating: 
[T]he duty at issue in actions for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy does not arise out of the employment contract. It is 
imposed by law, and thus is properly conceptualized as a tort. 
Significant consequences flow from this conceptual approach, one of 
which is the type of damages available. When a contract theory is 
applied, compensation may be limited to economic losses such as 
back pay. Moreover, concepts of foreseeability and mitigation apply. 
In contrast, " [a] tort theory will pennit the recovery to transcend these 
limits and may also serve to avoid limitations on recovery that may be 
imposed by the collective bargaining agreement or other contract. 
Most notably, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages under tort 
law. 
9 lt is undisputed in this case that the UOSH Act indicates a right to report 
workplace injuries on the part of Utah employees, that said right is clear and 
substantial, and that Mr. Graham's wrongful termination seeks to assert such 
a right. 
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The limited remedy provided by the UOSH Act, if construed as being 
exclusive, would be grossly insufficient to support the clear and substantial 
policy in support of reporting workplace injuries. Although the legislature 
may define the scope of remedies available for a specific injury, the 
sufficiency of such remedy in comparison to the nature of the protected right 
may bear upon whether the statutory remedy is comprehensive, as required 
for pre-emption under Gottling. The very limited remedies and limitations 
period under §34A-6-203(2)(c) may be appropriate for an expedited and 
non-exclusive administrative process. However, standing alone, they would 
be insufficient to protect the important public policy favoring the reporting 
of workplace injuries. The remedy provisions under the UOSH Act are not 
sufficiently comprehensive to signify an intent to pre-empt alternative 
claims. 
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Mr. Graham has claimed his attorney's fees in this case based upon 
his breach of contract claim in the District Court. Such claim is not at issue 
on this Appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse and vacate the Order of the District Court 
dismissing Mr. Graham's claims for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy on the grounds of pre-emption under Utah Code §34A-6-203 
and remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2019. 
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PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND 
DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
PERFORM DISCOVERY RELATED TO 
DEFENDANT'S WEAL TH 
Case No. 180900781 
Judge: Heather Brereton 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and supporting Declaration of Steven Eric Graham filed April 17, 2018, and on Albertson's 
Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed May 8, 2018. Defendant filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 8, 
2018; plaintiff filed a Combined Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on May 17, 2018; defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Albertson's 
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Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 24, 2018; and Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Supplemental Authority on July 30, 2018. The Court heard oral argument on the foregoing 
motions on September 7, 2018. Plaintiff was represented at oral argument by Kenneth B. Grimes 
and defendant was represented by Mark A. Wagner. After oral argument, the Court took the 
foregoing motions under advisement. Thereafter, plaintiff filed Plaintiffs Second Notice of 
Supplemental Authority on September 21, 2018. Having considered the pleadings and 
submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law, the court issued an 
oral ruling on the m,otions on September 26, 2018. The court hereby incorporates that oral 
ruling and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
DENIED and Albertson's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. In 
addition, as a result of the foregoing rulings, Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Perform Discovery 
Related to Defendant's Wealth is DENIED as moot. 
I. Both parties relied on essentially the same statement of material facts for the 
purposes of their cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Accordingly, there are no 
genuine issues of material fact that would preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
2. The parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment raise the same legal 
issue; that is, whether plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is 
preempted by the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act ("UOSH Act"). 
3. The Court finds that the UOSH Act preempts plaintiffs claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy. This finding is based on the Court's analysis of the 
UOSH Act itself. Although the UOSH Act does not contain an express exclusive remedy 
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provision, when examining the legislative intent behind the UOSH Act, the court finds that in 
passing the UOSH Act, the legislature put in place a comprehensive piece oflegislation to 
provide for the safety and health of workers and provided a coordinated plan to establish 
standards to do so. The Court finds that a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and 
purpose of the UOSH Act. The UOSH Act establishes standards, procedures, a scheme of 
regulation, and a bureaucratic system to implement its aims in a timely and cost-effective 
approach. 
4. The Court's notes plaintiff's argument that Utah Administrative Code rule 
R614-1-l O.L indicates that the legislature did not intend to preempt his tort claim, in that that 
administrative code provision provides for a postponement of the Administrator's determination 
in circumstances where other proceedings are ongoing and for deferral to the results of such 
proceedings. The Court's reading of that provision is that it applies to arbitration and other 
agency proceedings, and it does not change the Court's reading of the UOSH Act as it relates to 
a common-law tort claim, such as the one at issue here. 
5. The Court further finds that allowing plaintiff's common-law tort claim runs 
counter to the purpose of the UOSH Act in that it could discourage employees from making a 
claim under the UOSH Act in order to pursue broader remedies than those provided for under the 
UOSH Act, and that claims under the UOSH Act address the concerns not only of individual 
employees but also the broader purpose of providing for the safety and welfare of all workers 
through the broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act. 
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6. The Court further finds that when it analyzes plaintiffs common-law claim in this 
action, the UOSH Act provides the public policy supporting his common-law claim, and it 
establishes a procedure and remedy to address his claim, which is retaliation or discharge for 
reporting a workplace injury in violation of the UOSH Act. As such, the Court finds that the 
claim at issue comes within the scope of the UOSH Act's preemptive effect. The Court comes to 
this conclusion based on the indispensable element test set forth in Retherford v. AT&T 
Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). In applying this test, 
preemption depends on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim. Here, in 
Utah Code section 34A-6-203, the UOSH Act specifically addresses retaliation or discharge as a 
result of reporting a workplace injury, the very injury claimed by plaintiff in this action. The 
Court finds that the UOSH Act establishes a procedure for reporting and investigating a claim of 
retaliation and discharge, a forum to issue a decision or order, a remedy, and a procedure for 
review and appeal of that order. Further, in claiming discharge in violation of public policy in 
his tort claim, plaintiff relies on the UOSH Act as the statement of public policy. In the absence 
of the UOSH Act, plaintiff would be unable to make out his common-law claim. As such, the 
Court finds that the harm the UOSH Act addresses is an indispensable element of plaintiffs tort 
cause of action and, therefore, the UOSH Act preempts plaintiffs common-law claim here. 
7. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
DENIED and Albertson's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
Plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is therefore DISMISSED 
WITH PREJUDICE. 
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8. The only claim asserted by plaintiff in this action that would support a potential 
recovery of punitive damages is plaintiffs claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy. Because that claim is dismissed, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to 
Perform Discovery Related to Defendant's Wealth is moot. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for 
Leave to Perform Discovery Related to Defendant's Wealth is DENIED. 
-------END OF ORDER-------
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